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A Communal Affair over International Affairs: The arrival of IR in Late Colonial India 
 
This paper makes an archival journey into the making of institutes of international 
affairs in late colonial India. By exploring the intertwined lives of two such 
institutions, it unearths an ideational fight over the study of international affairs in 
India between the Indian Institute of International Affairs (IIIA), established in 
1936, and the Indian Council for World Affairs (ICWA), established in the 1940s. 
From the outset, the IIIA was strongly pro-government and saw the ICWA as an 
institutional rival and a propaganda front for the Indian National Congress (INC). 
Closer to independence, the two institutes were increasingly divided on communal 
and nationalist political lines. The IIIA‟s leadership became dominated by 
Muslims and the Muslim League and the ICWA by Brahmin Hindus and the INC. 
In this context, a battle for legitimacy and recognition ensued over participation in 
international conferences and the ability to publish meaningful research. The 
ICWA successfully organized the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947, 
which sealed the fate of the IIIA, which moved to Pakistan with Partition and 
quietly closed down, after coexisting briefly with the Pakistan Institute for 
International Affairs (PIIA). 
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Introduction: The Arrival of IR in India  
 
Conventional narratives of the study of International Relations (IR) in India begin with the founding 
of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in 1943, under whose auspices the School of 
International Studies (SIS) was opened in 1955.
2
 Nehru‟s influence was critical in these initiatives 
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and Indian IR thinking, it is assumed, remained wedded to the Nehruvian postcolonial project. 
However, the history of IR in India is more complex and precedes the ICWA story by about a 
decade, if not more. Indeed, IR‟s arrival in India was tied to the global history of IR, which, as 
recent revisionist disciplinary histories suggest, was embedded in the imperialism of the US and the 
UK.
3
 The arrival of these institutes also presents to us a fascinating case in South Asia‟s 
international history, which reveals the struggles for international recognition of India just prior to 
independence, and the last-ditch attempts by the Indian colonial government to control discourse on 
and the study of international affairs. 
 
Early „think-tanks‟ of IR, and certainly its first, the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(RIIA, also known as Chatham House) were initiated and helmed by the Round Table group, an 
empire-wide community of Anglo-imperial enthusiasts. They founded Chatham House in 1919,
4
 
with the belief that, to paraphrase Peter Lasslet, the horrors of war had made international politics 
too serious a task to be left to politicians. Consequently, the „scientific study of international affairs‟ 
would allow academics to chart the course of the future.
5
 Given their belief in positivist knowledge, 
the Chatham House founders were convinced that objective and scientific study of international 
affairs would lead to world peace.
6
 They successfully opened similar groups across the British 
Commonwealth.
7
 This idea was premised on the pre-World War I work of the Round Table 
movement, which had envisioned the British Commonwealth as an „Organic Union‟.8 During the 
war, such groups were particularly strong in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Attempts to open 
such groups were made even in India, albeit with limited success.
9
 Through the institutes the Round 
Table had enabled in Canada (1928), Australia (1933), New Zealand (1934), South Africa (1934) 
and finally India (1936), they hoped to bind the empire together by circulation of ideas while 
emphasizing a common identity.  
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Although their work is somewhat distinct from IR in universities, these institutes are still 
important to disciplinary history as they honed a „scientific‟ method for the study of international 
affairs.
10
 This empirical approach of studying IR to fit political agendas is evident today in research 
projects and publications of think-tanks globally. The origins of this form of research can be traced 
back to the journal The Round Table, founded in 1909. In the 1940s, most Chatham House affiliated 
institutes established journals which remain key outlets for IR today.
11
 The PIIA‟s Pakistan 
Horizon and the ICWA‟s India Quarterly fulfill this same role.  
 
This paper tells the forgotten tale of the IIIA. Founded in 1936, this short-lived institute was 
caught in political and communal crossfires of the time. Although notionally independent from the 
government and aimed at promoting the objective study of world politics along the Chatham House 
model, our story reveals the farcical nature of this attempt. We show that from its founding, the 
Institute was tethered to the colonial Indian government and did no work at all, let alone „scientific‟ 
research. The ICWA, in fact, emerged as a rival organisation to the IIIA in early 1940s, just as the 
anti-colonial movement in India reached its peak. The ruptures that eventually led to Partition were 
also inscribed in the emerging rivalry between the two institutes, as they were maneuvered along 
political and communal fault lines that separated the INC and the Muslim League.
 
A hard fought 
battle for legitimacy ensued, at the end of which the IIIA moved to Pakistan and briefly co-existed 
in the same room with the newly founded PIIA, before folding in 1948.  
 
Founding the Institute 
In September 1932, Chatham House received an unlikely request for grants from an Indian scholar 
of international law. Lanka Sundaram, later an Indian parliamentarian, informed Ivison Macadam, 
the RIIA‟s secretary, that he had started an „Indian Institute for International Studies‟ at Bezawada 
(Vijayawada) in South India with „a view to help India rise in her proper stature in the comity of 
nations‟.12 Sundaram knew the workings of Chatham House well. He had worked in its library and 
contributed an article to its journal and published alongside Alfred Zimmern and Charles 
Manning,
13
 both early university professors of international affairs and prominent members of 
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Chatham House.
14
 As such, he sought to affiliate his institute with Chatham House. On account of 
„the poverty and general unpreparedness of India‟, he requested that Chatham House fund his 
endeavor in order to consider matters of international affairs seriously.
15
  
 
 Macadam wrote to the India Office to investigate Sundaram and his institute. The request 
reached the Madras Government, which dismissed Sundaram as „an ardent Congressman with anti-
British views and bitterly hostile to the present policy of government‟. 16  The India Office 
counselled Chatham House to „wait and see whether the institute is capable of standing on its own 
legs before affording it assistance, and cautioned that „Sundaram himself is a man of no property 
and no profession, the son of a cook‟ and that his real aim was to secure himself a „lucrative 
appointment‟.17 The India Office advised Chatham House not to cooperate with Sundaram „until it 
is evident that [his Institute] is not likely to fall under the influence of Congress opinion‟.18 
Sundaram‟s request was dismissed.  
 
The following year, in 1933, the RIIA organized the first unofficial British Commonwealth 
Relations Conference in Toronto, where plans for future development of such institutes were 
formally discussed. 19  An Indian delegation led by Diwan Bahadur A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, 
including Zafrulla Khan, Mir Maqbool Mahmood and Laurie Hammond, was invited to attend.
20
 All 
representatives were close to the colonial government and the delegation followed the then-set 
tradition of including non-official members from the legislative assemblies, a representative of the 
princely states, and a British member. At the conference, the Indian delegation expressed strong 
interest in opening an institute in India. Mudaliar argued that „it was very desirable that an Institute 
should be established in India‟ consisting of a central institute at Delhi and branches in the 
provincial capitals. He enquired , however, „how the high standard of membership of [Chatham 
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House] was achieved and had not developed into a “fashion”‟.21 Concerned that such an institute 
might criticize the colonial government‟s policies, Mudaliar also wanted to know „how it had been 
possible to exclude discussions on purely domestic questions...‟.22 Chatham House was enthusiastic 
and informed him that 38 of its members were in India and hence there as a considerable knowledge 
base to draw from.
23
 Subsequently, Chatham House held discussions with Girija Shankar Bajpai,
24
 
Tej Bahadur Sapru
25
 and Surendra Kumar Datta,
26
 apart from Mudaliar and Zafrulla Khan.
27
  
 
Consequently, on 3 March 1936, the Viceroy‟s House in Delhi played host to a few Indian 
liberal politicians and bureaucrats,
28
 who formally established the IIIA. This meeting elected 
Zafrulla Khan, then a young and dynamic Muslim politician who had been drafted into the 
Viceroy‟s executive council,29 as the chairperson of this new institute. The Viceroy was made the 
ex-officio president. This meeting, in the words of Stephen King-Hall, was made possible through 
the „energy and initiative‟ of Frederick E. James, a European member of the Central Legislative 
Assembly,
30
 who along with M.S.A. Hydari, a member of the Indian civil service, was elected as 
the Honorary Secretary. B. Shiva Rao, labour leader and journalist, was nominated as the 
Organising Secretary. Invitations to join were also sent to pro-Congress leaders such as Bhulabhai 
Desai and Sarojini Naidu.
31
 Although most of its council comprised of bureaucrats and politicians, 
the Institute sought a „non-political‟ character, precluding it from „expressing any opinion, from 
endorsing any policies, or from conducting any propaganda on any aspect of international affairs‟.32 
Its founding statement noted that its sole purpose was „encouraging and facilitating in India the 
scientific study of international questions‟. 
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However, the Institute‟s pro-government character, reflected in its membership and 
leadership, implicitly flouted the „non-political‟ requirement of Chatham House. S.K. Datta, the 
oldest Indian member of Chatham House, refused an invitation to the executive council arguing that 
there was little space for an institution like this in India because it would be controlled by 
government officials.
33
 
 
At the IIIA‟s founding, Stephen King-Hall, Chatham House‟s representative and 
chairperson of its Endowment Committee, argued that a suitable Secretary General had to be found 
for the Institute‟s first two formative years. They would need to make a prolonged India tour to 
acquaint themselves with Indian conditions. But, with scant regard to the Indians present in the 
room, King-Hall added patronizingly, such a person „should be an Englishman, with experience of 
the working of Chatham House and preferably only a slight previous acquaintance with Indian 
conditions‟. Moreover, he „should be unmarried‟, unless the spouse was effectively „his unpaid 
assistant‟.34 Datta noted despairingly in response:  
 
All things that emanate from Delhi and Shimla, whether it is the Red Cross or the 
St James Ambulance or the Dufferin Fund or the Boy Scouts, do so from the 
departments of government. Has it not occurred to anybody to see that an Indian is 
found and trained for this work. …[appointing an English Secretary General would 
never be] put forward to a Japanese Committee or a Chinese Committee.
35
 
 
The first meeting of the Institute was held in Shimla on 3 October 1936 where the South African 
Minister for Interior Jan Hofmeyr, leading a South African delegation to India, delivered an address 
titled „A South African looks at the Empire‟.36 Two branches were opened in Calcutta and Bombay. 
They soon became dysfunctional. Despite the initial fanfare, prior to WWII, the Institute „only had 
odd meetings‟, at which „the attendance was thin, the discussions on topics were poor and dull, and 
there was nothing of real interest in these activities‟.37 The Calcutta branch closed in December 
1940, while the Bombay branch „practically ceased activity‟.38 Furthermore, although the Institute 
had originally envisaged on the Chatham House pattern, „research into international problems by 
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individual members and study groups by experts‟,39 it conducted no research until the early 1940s.40 
Its only function was to send representations to the International Studies Conferences of 1939 and 
1940 and the 1938 unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference in Sydney. For the 
latter, the Indian contingent went without any preparatory work.
41
  
 
Rejuvenating the Institute and the Emergence of the ICWA 
By 1942, WWII had extended to the Pacific and the British Empire was threatened by Japanese 
advances. Although the formal entry of the United States into the war had come as a huge relief to 
Britain, American politicians were generally hostile to British imperialism. Both Whitehall and 
New Delhi were worried about pro-Congress propaganda carried out by the India League in 
America, believing it could jeopardize American support. The League had argued that until India 
had a national government, the country‟s human and military resources could not be fully mobilized 
for war.
42
 G.S. Bajpai, who had recently arrived as India‟s Agent General, wrote in May 1942 that 
there was a strong need to counter Indian nationalist propaganda which found considerable 
sympathy with anti-British undercurrents in America, shaped by the country‟s own revolutionary 
history and its significant Irish population.
43
 
 
An important non-government platform that shaped such opinions was the Pacific Relations 
Conference, organised by the liberal internationalist US-based Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).
44
 
Its eighth conference was proposed in September 1942 in the US (subsequently taking place in 
Mont Tremblant, Canada, in December 1942). Edward Carter, the left-oriented Secretary General of 
the IPR, had visited India in 1935 where several Indians had expressed the hope of opening a 
National Council of IPR in India. He was, however, told by the Viceroy and S.K. Datta that an 
Indian IPR delegation would only be of service if „it is authentically Indian; if it gets its stimulus 
from the Pacific rather than from England, and if its development is on scientific rather than on 
political and government lines‟.45 The possibility of such an institute, whose members were mostly 
Indian and was driven by its Indian rather than imperial outlook, without drawing its patronage and 
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worldview from the colonial government, was impossible.
46
 The IIIA, founded a year after this 
visit, had validated these concerns. Hence, Carter was keen to invite a delegation more 
„representative… of Indian citizens‟ than the IIIA.47 
 
Considered „anti-British‟, Carter‟s and the IPR‟s moves in India were viewed suspiciously 
by the British. Carter had previously funded Nehru‟s 1939 trip to China and was allegedly close to 
the India League.
48
 Keen to have the INC represented in the 1942 IPR Conference, Carter sent an 
invitation to Jawaharlal Nehru (he also considered inviting C. Rajagopalachari, as Nehru had been 
jailed). Unconfirmed rumours also reached Whitehall that Nehru had been invited to visit President 
Roosevelt. This made both Whitehall and the Indian government anxious about American support 
to the war effort.
49
 
 
British representatives in America were pleased, however, that the failure of Cripps Mission 
and Gandhi‟s insistence that Indians should not be engaged in the war, and should deal with the 
Japanese threat through nonviolent means had created an impression that the Congress was 
unreasonable.
50
 Lord Halifax, the British high commissioner, argued that „Congress pacifism has 
aroused impatience and Congress distrust of loan of technical and military aid has caused 
resentment‟.51 Consequently, Bajpai wrote, „psychologically, the atmosphere has never been more 
propitious to educating the American peoples to take a more balanced and detached view of the 
Indian political situation‟.52 Bajpai suggested that pro-government Indian leaders should visit the 
US on lecture tours to counter nationalist propaganda, alongside attending the IPR Conference.
53
 
 
Buoyed by this, Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to Lord Linlithgow, the 
Viceroy, that to prevent invitations to Congress-aligned individuals, efforts should be made to 
secure invitations for the IIIA.
54
 The IIIA would give the requisite air of autonomy to the Indian 
delegation while at the same time ensuring, as another internal government memo noted, that the 
„right kind of Indians attend the meeting‟. 55  Olaf Caroe, the Secretary of India‟s External 
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Department, wrote that they should „handpick the Indian representatives and do everything possible 
to stop the Chinese and Americans from talking pernicious non-sense about British imperialism in 
India‟.56 Consequently, Bajpai, who was friends with Carter, was asked to secure a direct invite to 
the IIIA. Carter readily agreed, knowing little that the whole delegation was chosen by the Indian 
government. Linlithgow appointed Ramaswami Mudaliar, who was also then Chairperson of the 
IIIA, to lead the delegation. The final delegation comprised Zafrulla Khan, M.C. Khanna, Begum 
Shah Nawaz, K.M. Panikkar, S.E. Ranganathan and N. Sivaraj.
57
 Importantly, as advised by Bajpai, 
the delegates were also to give lectures across America to influence the American opinion on India. 
 
Despite Carter‟s wishes, the delegation, had an „official‟ stamp to it. Carter suggested to 
Bajpai that Congress delegates should be included in the Indian delegation. E.J. Tarr, the 
chairperson of the Pacific Council, also emphasised the „desirability [of] having [a] non-official 
Indian‟ on the delegation.58 But Bajpai responded that the Indian government could not be expected 
to receive such a suggestion favourably, considering that the Congress had just launched the Quit 
India Movement.
59
 After the Indian government threatened to withdraw from the conference
60
 and 
Chatham House, which served as the IPR‟s National Council in the UK, expressed concern that its 
Indian affiliate was deliberately being sidelined by Carter,
61
 the Indian delegation was accepted. 
 
Larger issues, however, were brewing within the Institute in India. Anantrai Pattani, Dewan 
of Bhavnagar state and a member of the IIIA, wrote to Chatham House‟s founder Lionel Curtis that 
the Indian delegation should have included „best possible personnel to represent [the] Indian branch 
of the Royal Institute at Pacific Conference‟ and suggested that people of M.R. Jayakar‟s62 and Tej 
Bahadur Sapru‟s stature should have been in the delegation.63 Pattani‟s telegram to Curtis, although 
dismissed by Chatham House Secretary Ivision Macadam as inconsequential,
64
 pointed towards 
deeper-seated problems. Sharp differences had arisen within the IIIA due to the intensifying 
nationalist movement. A rival faction, led by men including P.N. Sapru,
65
 H.N. Kunzru
66
 and B. 
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Shiva Rao, now increasingly resented the Institute‟s pro-government outlook. The way the Mont 
Tremblant delegation was picked had proved to them that the Institute was a lackey of the 
government.  
 
While the Indian delegation went to Mont Tremblant as an official delegation of the IIIA, 
the dissenters pointed that it had not organised any meetings to confirm these delegates, nor were 
other members consulted. Further, Mudaliar had ceased to be the chairperson of the Institute in 
October 1942 and had no right to choose the delegation on the Institute‟s behalf.67  After the 
government realized these procedural errors, Mudaliar accepted that the delegation did not represent 
the Institute as the Viceroy had appointed him in personal capacity to the delegation. Indeed, the 
delegation was funded by the Indian government.
68
  
 
At Mont Tremblant, anti-British sentiment, especially among the Americans and Chinese, 
was strong. Carter himself made no bones about it, especially on the issue of imperialism in India. 
In discussions on the specially convened round table on India in the conference, the dominant mood 
was anti-British. An internal British memo noted „a plan by means of this Round Table for a pro-
Congress demonstration which would set up ripples, or rather tidal waves, to wash Gandhi and 
Nehru out of prison‟.69 In response, Mudaliar was forced to grant concessions. He proposed the 
complete Indianisation of the Viceroy‟s council and establishing an exploratory commission, which 
could include foreign observers, for the creation of a constitution-making body. These went further 
than the Indian government‟s position and surprised even the British delegates. Back in India, 
Mudaliar was admonished in departmental communiques for „speaking with complete 
irresponsibility‟, although they acknowledged that this helped the Indian delegation demonstrate 
independence.
70
 Major A.S. Shah, an officer from External Affairs department who served as the 
secretary for Indian delegation, wrote a scathing report arguing that Carter had strongly canvassed 
for a pro-Congress point of view in the Conference. The IPR report on the Indian Round Table, he 
alleged, was laden with an anti-British bias.
71
 Carter, he wrote, was keen on opening a National 
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Council of IPR in India which would be closer to Congress and posed „a danger of this organisation 
taking a communal bias and indulging merely in anti-British feelings‟.72 
 
To counter this, Shah advised that immediate steps should be taken to „strengthen the 
existing branch of Chatham House‟ in India. Its membership should be extended among selected 
non-officials and, importantly, a permanent secretary should be appointed. The Institute should 
draw a constitution and begin publishing and disseminating studies.
73
 He had also accompanied the 
Indian delegates on lecture tours to America after the Conference and was convinced that these 
lectures had helped greatly in turning the American opinion against „a class of people [the 
Congress] who are out to establish a system of government based on antiquated notions of caste and 
rule of numerical majority‟. 74  He envisioned the Institute‟s work helping in furthering such 
informed opinion nationally and internationally. During the war the funding support for the IIIA, he 
wrote, would have to primarily come from the government.
75
 
 
Back in India, Caroe wanted to publish Shah‟s report to discredit the IPR by emphasising its 
biased nature.
76
 However, Mudaliar advised against publishing it and in turn suggested that the IIIA 
should apply to become an affiliate of the IPR, in order to preclude the latter‟s plans of creating a 
pro-Congress National Council in India.
77
 The Viceroy supported Mudaliar‟s suggestion and 
advised revitalising the IIIA.
78
 Accordingly, Mudaliar raised the membership issue with Carter, who 
told him that the IIIA would have to reorganise itself according to the IPR guidelines (which 
included complete autonomy from the government and representation of all principal groups in a 
country). Carter promised Mudaliar that if such changes were made, the Institute would be formally 
admitted upon an application in this regard before the next meeting.
79
 
 
Meanwhile, differences within the Institute became public on 24 August 1943 when Kunzru 
and P.N. Sapru issued a circular that called for „the immediate establishment of an independent 
organisation for the study of world affairs‟ in India.80 The circular foregrounded this need on the 
newly established principles of the Atlantic Charter, especially relating to the future of 
dependencies and colonies, and more generally, on the need to create a machinery for world peace. 
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Critiquing IIIA‟s representation at the Mont Tremblant Conference, Kunzru and Sapru noted that 
given „the urgent need for a thorough study of such questions... and the importance of India being 
represented at any Conference that may be held hereafter for their discussion, by delegations 
capable of voicing the views and aspirations of the great majority of people [emphasis added]‟, a 
new institute was necessary.
81
 This statement gestured towards the lack any serious research being 
undertaken by the IIIA, and its pro-government and non-representative character, which, given the 
growing likelihood of independence, made the Institute increasingly irrelevant. 
 
Stung by these internal criticisms and pushed by the IPR, the IIIA was now keen to 
revitalise itself. At the behest of the government, many organisational changes were introduced. 
Sultan Ahmad, the member for Information and Broadcasting department in the Viceroy‟s 
executive council, was made the new chairperson of the Institute. In November 1943, Ahmad 
proposed wide ranging changes in the organisation and working of the Institute aimed at increasing 
the membership, opening new branches across the country and setting up of a Secretariat with a 
full-time secretary and clerical staff. These proposals also announced that the IIIA „would be a body 
of independent status in no way controlled by any government department or made a subordinate 
organ of government policy‟.82 Further, on the Chatham House model, Ahmad proposed that the 
Institute should focus on „scientific research on international questions‟ and consider the production 
of a periodical journal overseen by a Research Director.
83
 
 
Although Ahmad promised institutional autonomy, this was almost immediately 
compromised when he requested government funding. This was particularly ironic, given that he 
was head of the government‟s propaganda department. Nevertheless, the finance department 
quickly agreed to make a grant of Rs. 80,000 per annum for the first two years and an additional 
sum of Rs.10,000 for the library.
84
 The only substantial non-government support came from Pattani 
who had promised a sum of Rs. 100,000 for building the new headquarters in Delhi. 
 
Ahmad advanced his new proposals in a stormy meeting of the IIIA executive council on 15 
November 1943. Chaired by Ahmad, the meeting included: P.P. Pillai (Vice Chairperson), Kunzru, 
Mudaliar, Zafrulla Khan, P.N. Sapru, C. Jahangir, U.N. Sen, N.M. Joshi and Narain Mahtha. When 
asked to explain his move for forming a rival organisation, Kunzru replied that his dissatisfaction 
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with the IIIA was because „he saw nothing really Indian in the Institute. Neither in the discussions, 
nor in the composition either of its council or its general body could he find substantial element 
representing Indian views or Indian sentiments or aspirations‟. 85 Replying to Kunzru‟s accusations, 
Ahmad stated that his new proposals met with most of Kunzru‟s concerns. Kunzru promised to 
reconsider his decision in a meeting with his friends six days later.
86
 This 21 November meeting 
instead birthed a new institute: the ICWA.
87
 B. Shiva Rao alleged that the Indian government tried 
to prevent the establishment of the Council. Carterm, who was in India on a visit to discuss this new 
body with Kunzru and others, was effectively blackmailed by the Indian government to withdraw 
from further discussions by making his further journey to Moscow conditional upon him not 
meeting Kunzru.
88
  
 
The Struggle for Survival: IIIA and ICWA 
If the IIIA was based on the Chatham House model, the ICWA „owed its inspiration to the IPR‟.89 
Following IPR requirements, it committed to keeping its executive council and the majority of its 
members non-official (although government officials were allowed to become members). Further, 
its council was required to be representative of the principal groups and interests in the country. Tej 
Bahadur Sapru was chosen to be the president of the Council and vice-presidents included 
Congress-inclined politicians and business-persons such as Vijayalakshmi Pandit, G.D. Birla and 
Shri Ram. Shri Ram, a Delhi businessman, and Pattani provided initial the funding.
90
 B. Shiva Rao, 
the first organising secretary of the IIIA, also became the first organising secretary of the ICWA. 
Many IIIA members, such as Pattani, C.P. Ramaswami Aiyer, Sri Narayan Mahata and N.M. Joshi, 
were also on the executive committee of the ICWA.
91
 
 
 Over the next two years, the two institutes competed for legitimacy. They began producing 
research. After having published nothing in its first eight years, the IIIA published 17 pamphlets 
and organised 18 lectures in 1944. Likewise, by November 1945, the ICWA had published three 
monographs (with two more in press) and 8 pamphlets. It had also opened 11 branches across the 
country and formed two study groups on „India and Security in the Pacific‟ and „Progress towards 
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Self-Government in Dependent Areas‟ in Delhi and Poona (Pune), respectively. 92  Both the 
Institutes started their flagships journals in January 1945. In its founding statement, the IIIA‟s 
Journal of the Indian Institute of International Affairs (JIIIA) stated that new awareness on foreign 
affairs was needed because having been „directly and fully involved in the war, India has become 
more than ever aware of her place in the world, more than eager to play her part in the world‟.93 In 
contrast, the ICWA‟s India Quarterly, brandishing its anti-government credentials, retorted: „The 
fact that India has had no share in the shaping of her foreign policy is largely responsible for the 
absence of an effective public opinion here on foreign affairs, but the same fact makes continued 
vigilance all the more essential‟.94 In this sense, the ICWA and its journal was an attempt to project 
an international identity prior to independence, in response to the colonial government‟s effort to 
control discourse on international affairs. India Quarterly’s founding statement also implicitly 
critiqued the founding canard of Chatham House and its affiliate institutes that scientific study of 
international affairs will lead to peace. The newly recruited secretary of the ICWA and later the 
doyen of IR in India, Angadipuram Appadorai wrote in his editorial statement: 
For publicists, similarly, to claim that their discussions, however, well-informed or 
dispassionate will set all things right is a piece of professional pedantry, for it ignores 
the basic fact that social progress is the result of interaction of several factors of which 
understanding is just one.
95
  
 
In addition to research, there were fierce battles over legitimacy at international platforms, which 
took place over representation at The Unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conferences, 
organized by Chatham House, and the Pacific Relations Conferences organized by the IPR. As an 
official branch of the Chatham House, the IIIA qualified automatically for the former, but a place at 
the next IPR conference was up for grabs. 
 
 The ninth IPR Conference was scheduled for January 1945 in Virginia, US. Conscious of 
the problems of representation in the previous conference and the split that ensued, E.J. Tarr asked 
Maurice Gwyer, the Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University and former Chief Justice of India, for help 
in the selection of an Indian delegation of „five to ten members‟. Tarr told him that the IPR had not 
reached an agreement about affiliation to an Indian institute, and wanted to avoid such a decision 
given the problems between the two institutions.
96
 Gwyer met both Ahmad and Kunzru to devise a 
mechanism for Indian representation. He first suggested that the delegation be selected from 
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members from both the institutes. Ahmad agreed to this on the condition that the delegation should 
officially be regarded as representing the IIIA. Kunzru rejected this. Gwyer then suggested a joint 
delegation without reference to either institute. This was acceptable to Kunzru but not Ahmad. 
Unable to settle the conflict, Gwyer pointed out to Tarr two major differences between the 
institutions which made a solution unlikely. First was the widening gap between officials and non-
officials in India, as the independence movement continued to intensify. The IIIA was mostly run 
by government officials, which was „mainly... due to absence of interest in foreign affairs among 
non-officials‟. Second, the ICWA consisted „almost entirely of Members of one community and 
similar political complexion [Hindu, upper-caste Brahmin]‟. He noted that this led to the 
„possibility of... communal institutions springing up‟.97 Gwyer correctly sensed that the political 
fault lines in India were increasingly sharpening on these two issues: the opposition to the British 
and the communal issue. The pro-Congress Hindu elite was also increasingly anti-British, while the 
pro-Muslim League Muslim elite was closer to the British Indian government. The two 
organisations fell on either side of the divide.  
 
 Having realised that membership of the IPR would be a step towards legitimacy, both 
organisations considered applying separately. The ICWA was seized the initiative. On 24 March 
1944, it sent a letter to Carter requesting the ICWA‟s affiliation with the IPR. Once the ICWA sent 
its request, the IIIA was stuck. If it did not send a request of affiliation to the IPR, the ICWA would 
be affiliated by default which meant that „the [IIIA] would have suffered such a blow in the eyes of 
Indian public opinion that it would with difficulty recover (sic)‟.98 However, both Ahmad and 
Mudaliar were now against affiliation with the IPR, given its favoring of the ICWA, in particular 
Carter‟s alleged role in the latter‟s creation.99 Hence, Ahmad sought the advice of Chatham House 
on the matter.  
 
 By now, Chatham House was also uneasy about the IIIA‟s closeness to the government. In 
his reply to Ahmad, its chairperson Lord Astor wrote that the grant to the Institute from the 
government was indeed contrary to the principles of Chatham House.
100
 Any application made to 
the IPR might be prejudiced by acceptance of such a grant, he added.
101
 He further advised Ahmad 
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that Mudaliar should informally write to Tarr, expressing the Institute‟s intent of joining the IPR, 
given that the Institute had made the desired changes in its organisation.
102
 Accordingly, Mudaliar 
wrote such a letter, insisting that in the previous year the Institute had undergone major changes 
which made it non-official and self-sufficient. He added that the Institute was contemplating 
surrendering its government funding,
103
 which it did in September 1944.
104
 
  
 To find a way out of this conundrum, the IPR wrote to Chatham House for suggestions. The 
latter did not want to disappoint its affiliate in India nor be seen as partisan in India‟s internal fight. 
Through its representative at the IPR, Chatham House advised the IPR not to invite any Indian 
representation to the Conference. It also asked for the decision about affiliation to be postponed 
until the January Conference.
105
 The IPR accepted the latter suggestion and wrote to the ICWA that 
the decision towards affiliation of a National Council in India could only be taken at the IPR 
Conference in January.
106
 However, it was not ready to forgo Indian participation. 
 
 Tarr once again requested Maurice Gwyer to nominate his own delegation. He declined.
107
 
Afterwards, Tarr wrote directly to Tej Bahadur Sapru and Sultan Ahmad, the respective heads of 
the two organisations, asking them to send four members each. The ICWA accepted this 
proposition and appointed Vijayalakshmi Pandit, H.N. Kunzru, B. Shiva Rao and Gaganvihari 
Mehta. P.S. Lokanathan, the editor of Eastern Economist, served as Secretary to the delegation. 
Sultan Ahmad, however, sent a „polite refusal‟.108 Ahmad was far less polite in discussions with the 
Indian government. In a discussion with the foreign secretary, Olaf Caroe, Ahmad said that the 
„procedure suggested was an insult to the institute which on previous occasion was regarded as the 
only competent body‟ and that the „world council [was] a partisan and sectarian body being inspired 
partly by “certain American friends connected to the IPR”‟. The IPR, Ahmad added, was now „left 
with a team made up of all-Brahmin group of one school of thought‟.109 
 
 In a final effort at reconciliation, Tarr wrote to Mudaliar asking if merging the two 
institutions, since both of them were non-official and worked on the same issues, was a possibility. 
Alternatively he suggested forming an „Indian Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations‟ with 
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only two corporate members (the IIIA and the ICWA) and each would nominate exactly half the 
members.
110
 Nothing came of these suggestions. Tarr worried that the two organisations were 
„digging in for a fight to the death‟.111 They were. 
 
The ‘Fight to the Death’ 
While the IIIA was constantly under criticism for its official character, the Indian government and 
the India Office were keen to keep it alive. Both the India Office and the India External Affairs 
Department impressed upon Chatham House the need to find funding through alternative channels. 
In an informal meeting between Olaf Caroe and Margaret Cleeve, the deputy secretary of the RIIA, 
in November 1943, Caroe argued that unless Chatham House provided considerable subsidy from 
its own funds, government funding was the only feasible source for sustaining the Institute. Caroe 
warned Cleeve that the IPR, which was propping the rival faction of Kuzru and Sapru, „would step 
in and steal the thunder‟ if nothing was done. The Institute, he argued, had not been able to secure 
any funding from rich Indians, in response to which Cleeve suggested approaching the Rockefeller 
and Carnegie endowments. Caroe argued that seeking American funding for the Institute would be  
risky. He further argued that the Institute would need funds amounting to an initial amount of Rs. 
100,000 (£7,500), a recurring sum of £3,000 per annum and an additional amount of £2,000 per 
annum for a competent secretary. Caroe also suggested considering moving the Institute from Delhi 
to either Bombay or Calcutta, since in Delhi it could not shake off its official character.
112
  
 
Leo Amery and the new Viceroy, Lord Wavell, took keen interest in the attempts to 
reorganise and revive the institute, especially in the matters of selection of the Institute‟s delegation 
for the 1945 Unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference.
113
 But this Conference turned 
out to be the last major conference of the IIIA. The delegation was headed by Zafrulla Khan and 
included other Institute members such as K.M. Panikkar, Mir Maqbool Mahmood and Maharaj 
Singh. K. Sarwar Hasan, the new Director of Research, served as the Secretary. The Institute, 
however, fell back into oblivion after the Conference, partly because the two competing 
organisations were further divided along political and communal lines. The ICWA members were 
pro-Congress and the ICWA was seen as Hindu-dominated. While the Council‟s Muslim 
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membership had increased, most of these Muslim members were pro-Congress.
114
 The IIIA, on the 
other hand, increasingly became a Muslim (League)-dominated organisation („...with a sprinkling of 
Europeans‟)115 in its day-to-day decision-making. Hindus, however, were still a majority of its 
membership. Hindu members of the IIIA executive council, such as K.M. Panikkar and P.P. Pillai, 
also soon joined the ICWA and „indulge[d] in vigorous attacks‟ on the IIIA.116 Further, the Institute 
had returned the government funding, it struggled to find alternative sources. Chatham House‟s 
attempt to secure funding through Carnegie endowment failed. Run from one room in Delhi which 
worked both as office and library, the Institute, according to internal Chatham House notes, 
„continue[d] to exist but [had] little vitality‟. Its Secretary, K. Sarwar Hasan was „depressed and in 
consequence tend[ed] to be rather depressing‟.117 The membership remained low.118 The recently 
restarted branches in Bombay and Calcutta had once again become non-functional.
119
 In contrast, 
the ICWA grew in substance and stature. By the end of 1946, its membership was 1056
120
 and it 
had 15 active branches across the country, apart from the headquarters in Delhi.
121
 Although „non-
political‟ and „un-official‟, the ICWA was boosted by the presence of political stalwarts like 
Jawaharlal Nehru on its executive council. 
 
The Asian Relations Conference of 1947 sealed the rivalry between the two organisations. 
Convened exactly on the pattern of the IPR Conferences, the ICWA took upon itself the task of 
organising this massive conference between 23 March-2 April 1947 that eventually hosted 193 
delegates and 51 observers from 34 countries. The successful organisation of this Conference 
(which also produced a short-lived Inter-Asian Organisation, once again on the IPR template) 
catapulted the ICWA into limelight.
122
 The Conference further sharpened the divide between the 
two institutions.  
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 The Muslim League boycotted the Conference. Its newspaper, Dawn, whose editor Atlaf 
Hussain was a member of the IIIA and was close to Hasan, warned of „the expansionist designs of 
Indian Hinduism‟ and called the Conference „An Asian Fraud‟.123 P.N.S. Mansergh, the Chatham 
House observer to the Asian Relations Conference, noted that „prominent figures on each side 
[spoke] with great bitterness of the rival organisation‟.124 Ahmad and Hasan had decided to move 
the IIIA to the future Pakistan. Ahmad told Liaquat Ali Khan, the Muslim League leader, that if the 
Institute was not taken to Pakistan „it will be used against you [Pakistan]‟.125 To do this, Hasan 
engineered an increase in the pro-Pakistan Muslim membership of the Institute. He first got Ishtiaq 
Hussain Qureshi, a professor of history at Delhi University and an activist for the Pakistan 
Movement, elected as the Honorary Secretary of the Institute in place of F.P. Antia, a Parsee. 
Thereafter, closer to Partition, Altaf Hussain and Mumtaz Hasan, Liaquat Ali Khan‟s secretary, and 
Qureshi helped Hasan to enroll pro-Pakistan Muslim members into the Institute.  
 
 Under the Institute‟s constitution, the headquarters could be moved anywhere in India 
through a resolution passed in a general meeting. In a carefully planned move just a few days before 
Partition, Hasan called a general meeting of the Institute where pro-Pakistan members dominated. 
Altaf Hussain proposed that the Institute be taken to Karachi, which was then still within India. 
Hindu members in the meeting, such as Kunzru and Pattani, opposed this. Pattani reminded the 
meeting that he had donated a sum of Rs. 100,000 for a building to be constructed in Delhi. Ahmad 
replied that this sum would be returned if the Institute moved to Karachi. After some arguments, 
Altaf Hussain pressed for a vote on this resolution. The motion was easily carried, and the 
headquarters of the Institute moved to Karachi. Liaquat Ali Khan provided the facilities and rail 
wagons for moving the library and furniture of the institute to its new location.
126
  
  
 In Pakistan, the „Indian‟ Institute operated from Hasan‟s new home in Karachi, and later 
from three rooms in the Frere Hall building. With funding from Pakistan‟s government, Hasan 
started another institute from the same office, the PIIA, which was officially inaugurated by Liaquat 
Ali Khan in April 1948. The IIIA and PIIA briefly worked from the same office in post-Partition 
Karachi. But the IIIA was defunct.
127
 Its last official publication was a volume of its journal, JIIIA, 
which came out in the middle of 1947. It was difficult to formally dissolve the IIIA because 165 of 
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its 215 members still lived in India. Many suggested that Hasan might let it „die a natural death‟.128 
It is unclear how matters were finally settled, but some evidence suggests that an Extraordinary 
General Meeting was called in Karachi towards the end of 1948 to formally dissolve the Indian 
Institute.
129
  
 
Conclusion 
In narrating this story, this paper makes four interventions into the history of IR in India. First, it 
reveals the depth of history that IR in India has beyond Nehru and ICWA. Nehru‟s contribution to 
the development of IR in India is surely deserving of strong emphasis, but the context of IR‟s 
emergence in India was actually imperialism, which sparked a strong nationalist backlash. Second, 
this account allows us to re-interpret the institutional identities of two current South Asian research 
institutions, the ICWA and the PIIA. It is interesting to note that on their websites, the two institutes 
narrate their own stories very differently.
130
 The PIIA sees itself as an institutional successor to the 
IIIA, while the ICWA views itself as a sui generis institution: this article desmonstrates that the 
institutional inheritances of the organisations are rather different. The PIIA started while the IIIA 
was still technically functioning, while the ICWA was initiated by some members of the IIIA as a 
rival organisation. Some of their motives were certainly ideological – the organisation‟s closeness 
to government, for instance – but communal and nationalist identities and political contexts (the 
inevitability of independence by early-1940s) also strongly influenced this break-up. Third, this 
story helps us place the emergence of these Indian institutes within the global politics of institution-
making in IR at the time, especially in the context of Chatham House and the IPR. The Indian story 
is not a solitary one, but forms a part of the broader politics of the role of institutions in particular 
forms of knowledge creation. Finally, it shows us the colonial government‟s attempt to control the 
study of international affairs in India, and how the competing nationalist movements began to 
unwind this control, in an effort to project new international identities just prior to independence.  
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